

LABOUR MONTHLY

EDITOR R. PALME DUTT

NOTES OF THE MONTH

R. P. D.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE
LABOUR PARTY

Harry Pollitt

EDUCATION IN A DEMOCRACY

The late Dr. H. G. Stead

PRODUCTION OFFENSIVE

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SINGLE
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LABOUR MONTHLY DISCUSSION GROUPS

EVERYONE has their noses to the grindstone. We are all working to get the maximum output to make sure that our boys are well equipped to face the enemy. All eager to see a victory over Fascism as quickly as possible; to see that such a monster will never rise again in our midst.

How can we ensure all these things? The best results are always gained from those who know their job thoroughly, understand its intricate problems and have a real desire to get the job done. This is the best way to ensure a speedy and complete victory over our deadly enemy. To understand what we are fighting for. During the three years and four months of this war there have been many problems which have arisen, many intricate political and military situations which it has been difficult for many of us to understand and combat.

We are all working hard, and have little time to spare. Make all this hard work and sacrifice worth while by meeting other workers in this struggle and discussing the many problems which you do not understand, or putting your point of view, thus getting a clearer understanding yourself, and also helping others to do so.

There is a great opportunity for this in a LABOUR MONTHLY Discussion Group. If you write to us for particulars we shall be glad to tell you your nearest group, or will give you every assistance in starting one. The latter is not difficult. Most of our groups have been started by one or sometimes two readers gathering a few of their friends and acquaintances together, and from this have developed into very successful groups.

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NOTES OF THE MONTH

First Lessons of 1943—Need of Unified Allied Strategy—Glaring Contrasts—The One Thing Lacking—Mr. Attlee on a Supreme War Council—A Misleading Argument—President Roosevelt's Optimism—Lessons of African Offensive—Africa and the Second Front—Shipping Situation—Tackle the Hornet's Nest—Recast Allied Strategy—Significance of Soviet Offensive—Reactionary Dangers—Logic of Darlanism—Democratic Unity—Communism and Labour.

THE opening of 1943 has brought into the forefront in the sharpest form the problem of a common and united plan, policy, strategy and leadership of the offensive of the United Nations, and especially of the four major Powers on whom the main responsibility rests—Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States and China. The contrast between the powerful blows and continued advance now for two months of the Soviet offensive in Eastern Europe, the extent of which has once again taken the western official and professional experts by surprise; and, on the other hand, the absence of an offensive in Western Europe in the moment of highest opportunity; the rising tempo of the popular struggles in the occupied countries of Europe from France to the Balkans, under the stimulus of the Soviet victories, but left without military aid from the heavily armed Western Powers; the delays, confusions and miscalculations in Northern Africa, and ignominious consequences of the new appeasement policies; the dangerous signs of divergence of Anglo-American policy on current questions; and the uncertainties, successive postponements and contradictory character of governmental utterances on the central issue of the Anglo-American front on the European continent: all these evidences of lack of concerted policy have given rise to renewed and widespread public concern over the immediate perspective and conduct of the war. This concern has noticeably replaced the previous light-hearted over-confidence and assumptions of rapid automatic victory which the opening of the African offensive and

public bell-ringing to celebrate the initial successes had temporarily aroused among many unthinking sections.

IT is now plain to all that the question of a unified allied strategy has still to be tackled and solved. A giant opportunity is once more in our hands, thanks to the Soviet offensive. We cannot afford to repeat in 1943 the mistakes of 1942. Writing in the middle of January, it is not possible to anticipate the outcome of the vital negotiations which are now understood to be in progress, or the character of the Government's statement due to follow the reassembly of Parliament. But it is clear that the issue of a unified allied strategy in the general direction of the war, and especially of parallel action in the west to correspond with the Soviet offensive in the east, is now the central issue before the United Nations.

CAN it be said that there is yet in any serious sense a single concerted strategy, or direction of strategy, of the United Nations? The actual experience of the war up to the present, the disconnected character of the military operations which do not yet bring to bear the full force of the alliance against the enemy; the contrast between the main thrust of one ally and the simultaneous delays and reserving of the main forces by the other allies; the conflicting character of various official and semi-official utterances, whether on the general conceptions of strategy and the perspective of the war (Second Front, Europe, victory in 1943, etc.) or in the field of political strategy and diplomacy (Darlanism, Mihailovitch, recognition of pre-Munich

Czechoslovakia, policy in relation to India and the colonial peoples, etc.); the open divergence of policy in relation to North Africa, with the accompanying press controversies; all show that such effective unity has not yet been achieved. The experience of 1942 showed in glaring form, with the public discord on the central issues of policy, the deadly cost of such absence of unity. This was the main lesson of 1942. Must we repeat it in 1943?

WITH the opening of the Anglo-American offensive in Africa and the Soviet winter offensive by the end of 1942 a first partial step had been taken towards remedying this situation, and in the direction of parallel action by the allies delivering simultaneous blows against the enemy from different sides. But the indications of the opening of 1943 show only too clearly that full unity of action is still far from effectively established. Yet such unity is the indispensable condition for victory. Every other superiority is now in the hands of the anti-Fascist coalition—superiority of manpower, of war production, of resources and reserves. Only unity of action to utilise these advantages is lacking. The Axis, with inferior cards, is still able to play them in such a way as to endanger the allies, and to take advantage of every divergence or lack of cohesion or rifts of policy within the alliance. We must therefore direct all our efforts to overcome these difficulties, which are fomented and accentuated by the fifth column and the secret friends of Fascism in this country and the United States, and to strengthen and cement the practical unity of the anti-Fascist alliance, the unity of policy and action, as the sure path to victory.

IS there yet agreement even on the need for a unified allied strategy and direction of strategy? Doubt would appear to be thrown on this by the recent speech of Mr. Attlee, as Deputy Prime Minister, on December 15, when he poured scorn

on the demand for a Supreme War Council of the Allies as equivalent to a demand for the conduct of the war by "a mass meeting":—

Imagine the representatives of all the allied nations sitting round a table and deciding on the day-to-day problems of the war, or even just the major problems. Imagine the difficulty of reaching decisions, imagine the clash of opinion of the great retinue of officers who would be in attendance. In war what is necessary is decision, and rapid decision. You cannot conduct war by means of a mass meeting.

The irreverent might be inclined to answer that the discordant babel of official voices, of ministerial, military and aerial spokesmen of the various allied nations during the past twelve months, all pointing in different directions, has been far more like the conduct of the war by "a mass meeting"—and a very turbulent mass meeting—than would have been the more orderly and practical procedure of relegation of these controversies to inter-governmental and inter-staff (not bilateral) consultation to hammer out a unified policy and allocate the action of each nation according to such a unified policy.

BUT, in fact, this whole line of argument is an attempt, under cover of a fantastic misrepresentation of the supposed mechanics of a unified allied strategy ("representatives of all the allied nations sitting round a table and deciding the day-to-day problems of the war") to reject in practice the whole aim and conception of a unified allied strategy, in the name of the mechanical difficulties, although this aim has in fact got to be achieved, whatever the difficulties, if victory is to be won. The real issue of the absence of effective unity of strategy between the allies is concealed behind a fantastic picture of a diplomatic conference of twenty-nine nations endeavouring to direct day-to-day military actions. But it was not the mechanical difficulties of consultation which prevented the adoption of the Second Front in 1942. It was not

through mechanical difficulties that only an Anglo-American joint staff conference was held in July of last year, which, according to the accounts of Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt, reached the final decision for an African offensive in place of the Second Front in Europe; that this decision, governing the whole perspective of the war, was reached without consultation with the Soviet staff representatives; and that then in the following month, in August, this ready-made and already finalised decision in process of operation was communicated to the Soviet Government by Mr. Churchill's visit, in face of the visible and openly expressed divergent views of the Soviet representatives. The central question of a unified allied strategy is not yet the question of a single day-to-day direction of the war; it is the more elementary question of agreement between the governments and staffs of Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States in the first place, on the main lines of a concerted strategy. This is what has evidently not yet been achieved, and what needs to be achieved.

ON the other hand, President Roosevelt, so far from denying the possibility or necessity of a unified allied strategy, goes to the other extreme and has affirmed in his speech of January 7, with sublime optimism, that complete unity of plan and major strategy already exists, and that nothing is amiss.

There is a very real unanimity between the leaders of the United Nations. This unity is effective in planning and carrying out the major strategy of this war and in building up and maintaining lines of supply. I cannot prophesy. I cannot tell you when or where the United Nations are going to strike next in Europe. But we are going to strike and strike hard. I cannot tell you whether we are going to hit them in Norway or through the Low Countries or in France, or through Sardinia, Sicily or the Balkans, or at several points simultaneously. But I can tell you that no matter where and when we strike by land, we and the British and the Russians will hit them from the air steadily and relentlessly.

The declaration of the intention "to strike hard in Europe" has been univer-

sally welcomed. But the public may be forgiven for recalling that similar promises, far more explicit in form and in date, were made in the spring and early summer of 1942, and were subsequently explained away as "a ruse" intended to deceive the enemy. The studied vagueness of the actual perspective held out—"no matter where and when we strike by land, we will hit them from the air"—may be justifiably defended as a necessary concealment of plans from the enemy. But it is hardly sufficient grounds for confidence, especially after the experience of 1942, that the necessary unity of strategy on the central issue of the Second Front in Europe, and of the speed of its establishment, has yet been achieved.

IT is now beginning to be realised, even in quarters which were at the time hostile to the campaign for the establishment of the Second Front in Europe in 1942, that the key decision of the Anglo-American staffs and governments in July of last year, to postpone the Second Front in Europe, and to begin the Anglo-American offensive in Northern Africa, was based on calculations which have since been proved to be unjustified by the event. What were those calculations? First, as explained by President Roosevelt in his speech of November 10 last year, that the project of the Second Front in Europe in 1942, though "feasible" would have entailed too heavy a strain on supplies and shipping, and that the African project would entail less such strain. Second, that the prospect of the Nazi advance continuing in Eastern Europe to the completion of its objectives, the stabilisation of the eastern front, and the consequent liberation of the main Nazi forces to confront the invading Anglo-American forces in the west would have resulted in the defeat of the latter and a second Dunkirk. Third, that the conditions for a successful landing in Europe would be easier in 1943 than in 1942.

Fourth, that the obscure political intrigues with Vichy and the Vichy elements in North Africa would facilitate the rapid conquest of North Africa at little cost. Fifth, that the opening of the offensive in North Africa and rapid liquidation of the Axis forces in North Africa would in this way provide the speediest springboard for the advance into Europe.

ALL these calculations have since been proved ill-judged by the event, and have in their totality constituted a major strategic miscalculation, which lies at the root of present difficulties and which now requires to be remedied. First, the "greatest amphibian expedition in history" to Northern Africa, as described by President Roosevelt in his speech of January 7, made in fact the heaviest demands on shipping and supplies, and proved in fact that the shipping was available and the effective transportation possible to have accomplished with greater effect the shorter route to Europe; while the subsequent discovery is now made that still further supplies, with still heavier demands on shipping, are now necessary, under conditions more difficult than would have been the case for Europe. Second, the defeat of the Nazis before Stalingrad and the scale of the immediately following Soviet offensive, clearly foretold by Stalin to Churchill at Moscow in the autumn, once again took by surprise all the expert calculations, and to-day reveal to the sight of all what a situation for victory would now be opening out, had the Second Front in Europe been already established. Third, the delay has enabled Hitler to carry very much further forward his fortifications and preparations along the European coastline, so that the cost of the establishment of the Second Front in 1943 will inevitably be very much heavier in life and losses than it would have been in 1942, and grows heavier the longer it is delayed. Fourth, the discreditable reactionary poli-

tical intrigues in Northern Africa have increased the military difficulties, delayed success and produced a dangerous situation. Fifth, in consequence of these miscalculations, the liquidation of the Axis forces in Northern Africa has been delayed, with the result that the African expedition, in place of providing the anticipated speediest springboard to Europe, has now become an additional complication and source of difficulty, which is being exploited by the enemies of the Second Front as an additional argument against its establishment.

THE gravity of the Nazi submarine warfare is now becoming more sharply realised by public opinion, which had been partially lulled by the conventional optimistic official pictures and by the blanket of silence on the publication of any even limited shipping figures which could help to guide opinion as to the actual situation. The Soviet naval authority, Captain Chekhurov (*Moscow News*, September 30, 1942) estimated that in the first three years of war the Nazi submarine strength, which at the outset of the war totalled 71, had been augmented by 400 newly built, while 200 had been sunk, leaving a net increase to about 270, or nearly four times the figure at the beginning of the war; while the total of allied shipping sunk in the first three years of war was only a little less than the total sunk in the last three years of the first world war. Since then, it has been stated (*Sunday Times*, January 17, 1943) that the total of Nazi submarine production is now reckoned at a rate of 240 a year, with sinkings perhaps half this figure, or a rate of increase nearly twice the average of the first three years. British merchant shipping production has been unofficially estimated (*Evening Standard*, January 18, 1943) at two million tons a year deadweight or 1.4 million tons gross.

THESE are serious figures, and the foreshadowing—at last, but still only vaguely as a possibility, and not yet as a firm policy—of bread rationing, and further extension of the plough-up, underline their significance. All the measures for combating the submarine menace, for increasing merchant ship-building, and for restricting unnecessary imports, need to be further intensified. But at the same time the shipping front cannot be separated from the other fronts of the war. The advance of the submarine menace, with the pouring out of constantly increasing submarine forces, despite sinkings, cannot be met only by the existing counter-measures, in spite of which the menace in fact increases; but reinforces the necessity for the one finally decisive counter-measure—the tackling of the hornet's nest, by the offensive on the continent of Europe, control and unrestricted operation of whose productive forces is the basis of Nazi strength, and thereby the turning of all Nazi resources to the land front.

WHATEVER the calculations and anticipations with which 1943 opened, it is now necessary, in the light of the sweeping successes of the Soviet offensive, the heavy losses inflicted on the Nazi forces and the difficult situation with which they are faced, and the consequent new opportunities which now open out, to review and recast the entire strategy of the alliance in order to respond to these new opportunities without delay. The urgency of the establishment of the Second Front in Europe is enormously increased. We need to speed up the liquidation of the Nazi forces in Northern Africa, at the same time as we hasten the measures necessary for the speedy advance to the land offensive in Europe. We cannot afford to let this opportunity slip. The Nazi military machine must not again be given the time and the opportunity to regroup its forces as in the

spring and early summer of last year. From France to Hungary and Czechoslovakia, from Norway to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and Greece, the peoples of Europe are stirring with a rising tempo of struggle, with limitless daring and sacrifice, in response to the successes of the Soviet offensive and the prospects of the combined allied offensive. They are looking for our action. We must not fail them. Their opportunity is ours. The opening of the allied offensive on the continent of Europe will prove the signal for the release of the insurrection of the peoples against Nazi rule all over Europe.

SPECIAL importance attaches to the interview given by General Malinovsky, the victor of the Don offensive, to British and American press correspondents on January 17, in which he calls attention to the fact that additional Nazi troops have been drawn from Western Europe to the east, and that the African campaign has not yet drawn any Nazi forces from the eastern front:—

Since we have observed the arrival of new divisions from France, we can assume that the Germans are weakening their forces in Western Europe.

"What about the Second Front?" a correspondent asked.

"We are waiting impatiently for operations of our allies in Western Europe. The most important thing for us is to have the enemy forces weakened and drawn away."

"Has the campaign in Africa had any effect on the German strength on the Eastern Front?"

"Events in Africa are only a prelude to vaster operations. The campaign there has not drawn any forces away from this front."

The moral is plain, and a challenge to our action.

THE most dangerous obstacle to speedy full-scale action of the Western Allies in a combined offensive with the Soviet Union for victory lies in the reactionary political cross-currents in this country and the United States which hamper full mobilisation, intrigue with the puppets of Hitler, resist co-operation with the popular forces, delay and sabotage offensive action, and

fear the victory of the peoples for freedom. It must never be forgotten that the Soviet successes and the advance of the Red Army arouse a very different response among the masses of the people and among all those who sincerely desire the defeat of Hitler, from the response to which it gives rise among these reactionary forces who have always looked to Fascism as their bulwark, who fear that its downfall would lead to liberation of the peoples and to democratic and social advance, and who in consequence now increase their manoeuvres to prevent such an outcome and build up new forms and guises of reaction through a system of alliances with individual reactionary representatives from the camp of Fascism.

PUBLIC opinion has been aroused to the danger of these dark forces, in deflecting the strategy of the United Nations and hampering victory, by the powerful demonstration of the whole shameful political intrigue conducted in Northern Africa, with the protection and strengthening of the worst pro-Fascist forces and persecution of the anti-Fascists, and the consequent dangerous situation to which it has given rise. Darlanism in Northern Africa has not perished with the death of Darlan*, and will not perish until the whole Vichy-ordained Imperial Council, the pro-Fascist high administration and storm-troop organisations are swept aside to make place for the rule and authority of the representative organs of the French national anti-Hitler front, embodied in Fighting France and the French National Committee and such further democratic organs of French national unity as need to be built up on an increasingly broad basis in association with the mass movement carrying on the struggle in France.

* Since the above was written, the announcement of the special importation and appointment of the infamous Peyrouton as Governor-General of Algiers has still further intensified the issue originally raised by the appointment of Darlan.

BUT the symptom of the poison revealed in North Africa is not confined to that area. Another form of the same reactionary anti-popular policy still prevents the effective mobilisation of the Indian people in co-operation with the United Nations, and has led to an increasingly dangerous internal political and economic situation in India, with grave dangers for the whole perspective of the war in Eastern Asia. And a further symptom was revealed when such a journal as the *New York Times* could quote certain circles of Washington official opinion, in defending Darlanism, as hinting at a possible similar future settlement with Goering for Germany:—

One of these officials questioned said to-day: "War has forced us idealists and democrats to quantitative, rather than qualitative, morality as the test. If, for example, Goering should offer to come over with a few planes, we don't want him. He will cost more than he will contribute. But if he can bring the Luftwaffe with him, we'll receive him."

—(Arthur Krock, *New York Times*, quoted in the *New York Nation*, November 21, 1942.)

This is the logic of Darlanism, and the warning to all democratic forces in the United Nations.

ONLY unity of the democratic forces, unity of all democratic progressive anti-Fascist opinion, and active political response to all the present urgent issues, can defeat these dangers and ensure the strategy for a people's victory over Fascism. The key to such unity, and the decisive factor for influencing the political situation, lies in the unity and political responsibility of the Labour movement. That is why in this country at the present moment the application of the Communist Party for affiliation to the Labour Party is of vital importance, not only for the whole future of the British working-class movement and the realisation of its aims, but in the immediate present situation of this critical stage of the war against Fascism. There is no doubt that the achievement of such unity, with the stimulus and renewed vitality

which unity and the removal of fetters would mean for the whole Labour movement, would radically change the balance of political forces in Britain, would give new confidence and the sense of strength to the Labour and democratic movement, would hasten the strengthening of the Government and the strengthened role and influence of democratic anti-Fascist representatives within it, and would thereby profoundly affect the balance of forces in the United Nations, the policies and strategy pursued and the speed of the advance to victory.

THE Labour Party has passed through many forms and phases in the forty-two years of its existence, with the successive stages in the growth of the working-class movement, and under the impact of changes in the political situation and the world situation. The stirrings of the people which followed on the first world war and the Russian Revolution produced a transformation of the Labour Party in 1918, the drawing up of a new constitution, the changing of the basis of membership and the adoption for the first time of the aim of the socialist re-organisation of society. The stirrings which accompany the present world

war are greater and more profound, and will vitally affect the working-class movement in this country. The time is ripe for a new stage of advance.

IT was a signal advance when the trade unions definitely entered into the political field in 1900 by the formation of the Labour Party. It was a no less significant advance, despite accompanying weaknesses, when the trade unions, organised in the Labour Party, adopted the basis of socialism in 1918. In 1943 it is time for the further advance to the unity and equal rights of all sections in a common movement, through the affiliation of the Communist Party to the Labour Party. The response to the campaign for affiliation among all sections of the movement has shown the broadening realisation of its significance. But the time to Whitsun is short, and every effort must now be directed towards securing majority support for the campaign. The achievement of unity of the Labour movement would represent the most powerful weapon equally for the accomplishment of all the urgent tasks now essential for victory over Fascism and for the further issues and future advance beyond victory.

January 18, 1943.

R. P. D.

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The Communist Party and the Labour Party

by HARRY POLLITT

THE application by the Communist Party to be accepted as an affiliated organisation with the Labour Party is an important and serious political act. It conforms to the gravity of the war crisis and tasks that have still to be solved; to the needs of the people as a whole; and of the Labour movement in particular; and, above all, it is one of the decisive questions through which the future of the British people can be very considerably influenced.

It would be easy to suggest that there are no problems in the organised Labour movement to solve. But it would not be correct. It would be easy to make full play with the political differences of the past, as a means of avoiding facing up to the hard new facts of the present position. But if this were to be done it would not represent serious leadership.

No useful purpose will be served if in considering the serious political issue that has now been raised, any attempt either to discuss, oppose or support it, is based upon schematic or academic approaches. It is a new and urgent issue that the situation, and not individuals or parties, has brought forward.

The sober fact is that the question can only be seriously approached in the light of the experiences arising out of the present situation and in this light alone can anyone successfully formulate any future perspective.

Not only so, but there are a number of new international factors also inseparable from any serious consideration of the application of the Communist Party for affiliation to the Labour Party. That is, not only British conditions have now to be taken into account, but the obligations and responsibilities of the working-class movement of Britain to the international Labour movement, so many sections of which have been destroyed or prevented from functioning by Fascism.

It is inconceivable that any serious working-class leaders or organisations can visualise a position where the Labour movement can stand still, as if nothing of fundamental importance in the world had

happened—is happening now as these lines are being written.

The world can never be the same world as it was in September, 1939. Whether we like it or not, there are already many political changes taking place in the minds of millions of people in Britain and all over the world. The relations between States and peoples are being changed, and will change still further. The British Labour movement will not remain static; the Constitutions of its various organisations will not represent the last word in drafting objectives, and methods of achieving objectives. The tremendous sacrifices that the war against Fascism has already evoked, the greater sacrifices that victory will inevitably demand, the problems of winning the war, and the peace, pose before every serious and honest Socialist entirely new questions that prejudice cannot solve and refusal to face can only succeed in aggravating.

It would be inexcusable if it was not recognised that millions are passing through new stages of political development. There is a new awareness in existence, a keen desire to understand, a desire for unity, accompanied by astonishment that political differences of the past can be allowed to prevent mature judgment now being directed to achieve maximum unity while there is yet time.

The war has not only destroyed many illusions. It has also increased the desire to understand politics in a new way; for now, as never before, the fact that war is only the continuation of politics by other means is widely understood; and the old slogan of the last war—"Never Again"—has quite a different significance now from what it had in 1918.

It would be childish to pretend that the influence of the Soviet Union has not grown enormously, or that the whole basis upon which the Soviet Union is established is not now the subject of acute and fundamental discussion everywhere. The reason for this is clear. The Soviet Union is able to exert its vital influence on every aspect of international affairs, not

because of magic, but because it is based on working-class principles, unity, outlook, government; because it has been able to put into practice everything the old pioneers of Labour in every country in the world had in mind when years ago they took the soap box to the street corner, and were greeted as "dreamers" and "men before their time." It is futile to deny that the old bogeys associated with the words "Communism" and "Bolshevism" have been laid low for ever, or that the stand of the Soviet Union has been admired not only for what is new in its military technique, but for what has made it all possible.

It is all these many-sided factors which combine to bring about an entirely new political situation in Britain, in which it is imperative that an entirely new approach should be made by all responsible and authoritative leaders of the working-class movement. It is this situation and nothing else which has prompted the Communist Party to apply for affiliation to the Labour Party. It was its duty to the whole Labour movement that it should do so.

It has been done, not because some tiny political party desired to receive increased prestige because of its association with the powerful Labour Party that represents millions of organised trade unionists, co-operators and individual members. It has done so only in the interests of the Labour movement; the majority of the common people; of the nation; of true internationalism; of victory in the war and in the peace.

In the effort to bring about unity in the Labour movement it is a serious contribution by a growing political party, whose mass influence grows every day; whose 64,000 members cannot be judged only from that numerical standpoint. For none will deny that the members of the Communist Party are among the most active and self-sacrificing section of the organised working-class movement, and that from the point of view of political activity and campaigning it represents a membership many times the size of its actual number.

The Communist Party is proud of its mass activity, of the size of its meetings; the tremendous sale of its literature; the financial responsibility of the workers; the role played by its newspaper, *The Daily Worker*. It is proud of the responsible and

leading positions in the trade union movement held by men like Arthur Horner, President of the South Wales Miners' Federation; Abe Moffat, President of the Scottish Miners; J. A. Scott, member of the Executive Committee of the Amalgamated Engineering Union. Of Sam Henderson and A. F. Papworth, members of the Executive Committee of the Transport & General Workers Union, and the thousands of our comrades who hold trusted positions as shop stewards; members of trade union branch and district committees, the number of which would be greatly increased if it were not for "Bans and Black Circulars" that prevent Communists holding official positions in certain trade unions and on the trades councils.

These various bans against any forms of united activity with the Communists that have from time to time been imposed by the Labour leaders have proved in practice to be harmful to the Labour movement. They have held back its whole development. They have enabled the reactionaries at various moments in the political situation to get away with policies that have not only directly injured the daily interests of the workers, as was seen in the application of the Means Test, but also undoubtedly in the international sphere, by preventing the full force of a united Labour movement to be exerted; have encouraged these same reactionaries to pursue a foreign policy that fostered the developments leading to the outbreak of the present war.

The excuse has often been advanced in justification of this policy of discrimination against Communists that it is because they belong to some foreign organisation and are not in a position to formulate their own policy.

It is not true, it never has been true, and it never will be true.

The Communist Party is an important and growing political section of the British Labour movement. It was born and developed out of British traditions and conditions. Its policy is formulated on the basis of the economic, political and social circumstances existing in Britain and at all times are in accordance with the best present and future interests of the British working people. The international association of the Communist Party with working-class parties of all other coun-

tries in the world is only an expression of the true interests of the British working people.

● Anyone who cares to make a study of the political history of Britain since the last war will have no difficulty in seeing on how many occasions policies first advocated by the Communist Party were subsequently taken up by other sections of the Labour movement. More recently, it is very noteworthy to find in how many instances certain aspects of the policy to win the war, at first advanced by the Communist Party, have subsequently been taken up by all parties that are concerned to win the war over Fascism, rather than to win a war of their own making over the Communists.

We believe the time has come when it is necessary to say openly that no good purpose is to be achieved by allowing fear of the growth of Communism to become the alibi for hating Communism more than it has yet been found possible in some quarters to hate Fascism.

No country in the world will have so many formidable problems to solve when peace has been won as Britain. They will require everything that the Labour movement possesses in leadership, power, initiative and unity. If there is unity now, then the position will be easier to tackle, precisely because the Labour movement has a common policy, leadership, aim, united and organised political campaigning.

Here it is pertinent to note the way that the reactionary Tory Press commented on our application for affiliation. Most newspapers made no comment but gave the facts of our application. Not so the newspapers to which we have referred. Both in London and the provinces they showed their hand too soon. They expressed the conviction that it would be refused. If ever there was a case of the wish being father to the thought it is here.

If ever there was an argument that the application should be accepted it is here.

The very newspapers that built up Hitler, that applauded Munich, that opposed the Soviet Union until 1942, that wanted to declare war on the Soviet Union in 1939, that opposed the Second Front in Europe in 1942, that opposed coal rationing, and that now oppose the Beveridge Report—these are the same newspapers that now ask the Labour

Party to refuse the affiliation of the Communist Party.

Why? We suggest that the rank and file of the Labour Party as well as its leaders would do well to think on this.

But let us take another aspect of the situation—that of the international Labour movement. Only in the countries engaged in the present titanic struggle against Fascism can we say there are really legal representative Labour movements in existence, with the full opportunity of carrying out their various activities. They are the countries described in every article and speech by whatever orator or writer as “The United Nations.” It is war that has brought these nations together for the first time. Has this no moral or lesson for the British Labour movement? And would not any steps taken to achieve unity in the British Labour movement have profound effects upon the Labour movement all over the world?

In all other lands, the working-class movement is not only illegal, but also those who carry out its work are subject to the most frightful penalties. Yet it is also this experience which has forced Social Democrats, Communists, trade unionists and co-operators to unite in a manner that, tragically enough, they never found possible to achieve in peace time.

We suggest that these facts have now to be taken into account when considering the question of the affiliation of the Communist Party to the Labour Party.

Why? Because we have no doubt, this once achieved, there would open out great possibilities for the unification of the entire international Labour movement, to which, because of the special position that Britain holds in world affairs, we have a serious responsibility. No one can deny that once unity were established in the British Labour movement, it would have enormous effects throughout the rest of the international Labour movement. It is these great considerations which have also prompted our application for affiliation. We urge that they should be taken into account by all concerned.

The times are far too serious for political wise-cracking and scoring off each other. Far too serious for letting the past determine the future, when it is the pre-

sent that counts and can alone really determine what kind of future is in front for the British people.

We do not want here to take up space in analysing the present war crisis; that will have been done in other pages of LABOUR MONTHLY. But we do feel it necessary to point out that while it is true that the United Nations have passed from the defensive to the offensive, while great victories have been achieved in Africa and the Soviet Union, the main battles are still in front of us. The war has not yet been won. The victory is *not* "in the bag."

But we would be fools also, if we do not understand that the Soviet victories do not arouse the same hopes in all hearts as they do in those of the common people. Already the dark forces of reaction are more active than ever throwing spanners into the machinery of the United Nations. They will increase their dirty work as the Red Army advances. They will seek out every opportunity of trying to sabotage a tremendous victory in which the Soviet Union will have played such a dominant part.

This is why it is more true than ever before that vigilance and unity are the price of victory in the war and in the peace. This is why at this historic moment in world history nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of carefully considering any proposal that aims to eliminate divisions in Labour's ranks and to unite all its principal sections in defence of the interests of the common people. No alleged "insuperable differences in principle" ought to be manufactured to prevent that unity being established which alone can safeguard all democratic and socialist principles from the menace of Fascism, and give them the hope of triumph in the future.

The affiliation of the Communist Party to the Labour Party would help strengthen real national unity; would strengthen Labour's leadership and authority in the counsels of the Government and the nation as a whole; would make possible united organised political campaigns of a type that would greatly develop the will to

victory and the selfless determination that it shall be achieved in 1943; would result in an all round strengthening of the trade unions, co-operatives, individual membership both of the Labour Party and the Communist Party. It would have as one of its most important effects the realisation that the political unity that had been achieved should also be worked for inside the trade union movement to try to end the many divisions which still exist as between the craft, industrial and general workers' unions.

Unity in the British Labour movement would have a tremendous effect in stimulating the activity of the workers in every country enslaved by Fascism.

These are the reasons why we hope that our application will be seriously discussed in the factories, trade unions, local Labour parties, co-operative societies and guilds, by the District and Executive Committees of trade unions and trades councils.

This is why we hope that the Executive Committee of the Labour Party will arrange to meet representatives of the Communist Party to discuss the application, to allow both sides to get together so that common discussion and exchange of opinion could result in a position being reached where the Executive Council of the Labour Party would then recommend to its annual conference at Whitsuntide that the affiliation of the Communist Party to the Labour Party should be accepted.

We close on this note. In 1881, Frederick Engels, commenting on the growing strength of the British Labour movement, used these words:—

There is no power in the world which could resist the British working class as an organised body.

If that was true then, how truer it could be to-day, when on the background of all past experience and struggles, and fortified by the growing strength of the working class, if every ounce of energy we possess was bent on securing the maximum possible unity between all sections of the working-class movement in Britain.

Readers should note that the period during which payment would be made for returned copies of the LABOUR MONTHLY 1921 to 1941 has now expired.

Education in a Democracy

by the late Dr. H. G. STEAD

[With deep regret we record the death of Dr. H. G. Stead, the distinguished pioneer of educational reform, and Secretary of the New Educational Fellowship, formerly Director of Education for Chesterfield. This article was written by him for LABOUR MONTHLY a few days before his death, and embodies his views on the present issues of educational reconstruction and the proposed new Education Bill now in preparation.—ED. L.M.]

DURING the past year many proposals for the reconstruction of our education system have been put before the public. All the political parties have stated their views. The various professional organisations, administrators and teachers, have had their say. In addition, many bodies of interested lay people have shown more interest in education than they have ever done before.

Sometime during the near future, most probably during the present year, a new Education Bill will be introduced into the House of Commons. It will include some of the suggestions made in some of the Reports referred to above and it will exclude many others. How can such a Bill be judged? What provision should be insisted upon by those desirous of making the Bill more in keeping with the needs of real democratic advance?

Let us glance briefly at the system, or rather at the collection of systems, which are to be found in this country at present. First, there is the Preparatory-Public School system. In spite of its name this is an exclusively private system. The fees at both the lower end (the Preparatory Schools) and the upper end (the Public Schools) are high. Only those with considerable resources can afford to send their children to these schools. Some who cannot really afford to do this, struggle to make it possible. The reason they do so is not because they believe that the education their children will receive is worth the cost educationally, but because "a Public School education" is the key to positions of authority in later life.

Next to this comes the Secondary School system. This consists of secondary schools established under the Education Act of 1902 and maintained by the various Local Education Authorities, together with old endowed Grammar Schools aided by the Local Authority or the Board of Education. Most of these schools have had, in the past, preparatory departments and this has been one mode of

entry for those able to pay the necessary fees. Some children from elementary schools have been admitted to these secondary schools by a special place examination held when the children are about eleven years of age. It is true to say, however, that in the past, ability to pay has been more frequently the condition of entry than ability to profit by the education provided. In more recent years, however, some authorities have adopted the "100 per cent. special place" system. This means that all places at the secondary schools in question are filled on the basis of merit alone. This scheme tends to be adopted by more and more authorities. A proportion of the children from secondary schools proceed to the universities and enter the professions. Many proceed to training colleges and become elementary school teachers. The remainder enter commercial work, the lower grades of the Civil Service, and so on.

Then there is the private school system, comprising also schools sometimes known as the "independent" schools. These are apart from the State system and charge fees which vary considerably in range. So does also the facilities offered and the standard of the education provided. In this class are included schools which vary from the worst type of private school to the exclusive, elaborately equipped and staffed one. Some carry out genuine educational experiments. The clients of these schools are mainly to be found among those who cannot afford the public schools and yet are prevented by snobbish reasons from using the State ones.

Technical education is given in junior technical schools, trade schools and technical colleges. It is difficult to generalise here, but thirteen to fourteen is a common age for entry into the junior technical schools and trade schools. Most of the pupils come from the elementary schools. The courses provided are designed to prepare pupils for the skilled trades. The best pupils continue their studies at the

technical colleges and may become qualified as foremen and managers.

The elementary school system admits pupils at the age of five (down to two or three if a nursery school or department is available) and keeps them until they are fourteen plus (with the exception of those who win places at the secondary or junior technical schools). These children are the future "hands" in factories. Approaching 90 per cent. of the country's children go to the elementary schools. The rest are divided between the other systems.

This brief glance at the existing provision, for education brings home certain lessons about it. In the first place, it is a class system—the different types of schools are connected with certain social classes. The value of education is judged not by the development of ability which it produces, but by its social and economic values. It lacks cohesion as did the society which established it. There is nothing in common between the various systems and only occasional points of contact. Children so separated by education will remain apart throughout life. With such a provision for education a class-divided society is inevitable.

Let us now turn to the proposals made for educational reconstruction. If the Reports to which reference has been made are examined, some interesting results are obtained. First of all, there are certain suggestions which are common to all the Reports. These are: more nursery school provision; another year at school, making the leaving age fifteen plus instead of fourteen plus; a system of day continuation schools for young people from fifteen to eighteen; more adult education. These things were all included in Fisher's Bill introduced into the House of Commons during the last war. Then, however, they were made *permissive*, i.e., the local education authorities could make the provision if they wished to do so, but were not forced to make it. The result was that some did and some did not. To take one example, six authorities only raised the leaving age to fifteen plus by bye-law. The proposal now is that all this provision should be made compulsory. This is clearly a step in the right direction and one which can be whole-heartedly supported. At the moment, the Trades Union Congress, the National Union of Teachers, the Co-operative Educational

Association and the Workers' Educational Association are sponsoring a campaign for a programme that includes all this. This campaign should be vigorously supported in every possible way.

The second significant thing in the Reports is the list of items upon which there is not so much agreement. Amongst these are: the future position of the public and private schools—shall they be allowed to continue outside the State system, or be closed, or be incorporated within the State system? The question of the establishment of a common school at the primary school range, i.e., for children from seven to eleven or twelve—shall *all* children of this age, whatever the social status and/or financial position of their parents, be required to attend the same school? The "dual" system—shall church schools be allowed to continue under the control of the churches, which have not the means to maintain them adequately, or shall they either come under the control of the State or be licensed and inspected but wholly maintained by the churches? During the years from fifteen to eighteen shall the educative or industrial aspect of the young person's life be the dominating one?

A glance at these reveals that they are all social issues. The decision at which we arrive with respect to any of them depends upon the view we take as to the proper nature of society. In all educational discussions it is necessary to remember that education is an institution of society and that the purpose of any society determines the purpose of the educational system it sets up. So, too, it must be remembered that the purpose of education determines the structure of the educational system and also the content of education, that is, what is taught in the schools.

It may be thought that to say this is to adopt a defeatist attitude towards education and to suggest that until the State is changed nothing can be done regarding education. But this is never the case, and to-day such an attitude would be more than ever fatal to progress. For the current ferment in the social world is reflected as a ferment in the field of education. Much can be done now and should and must be done. What is essential is that before action is entered upon care should be exercised to ensure that the ac-

tion is in the right direction, that is, that it moves in the direction of the social changes necessary, that it does not create fresh obstacles to these changes, or strengthen existing ones.

In the light of this let us look again at the more controversial proposals. To do anything which would assist in the retention of the Public School system as it is to-day would obviously be to strengthen an obstacle to the establishment of a consistently democratic system of education. Therefore, the suggestion frequently made (and already being acted upon in a few cases) that a few elementary school children should be given scholarships at the public schools must have no support from those who wish to see the end of prestige. The subtlety of this "generous gesture," as it has been called, is obvious. It appeals to the hope of every parent that *his* child may be the lucky one. In effect, it removes promising boys from the working class and absorbs them in the ruling class, where they are used to control the class from which they spring. The issue is sometimes confused by speaking of "boarding schools" instead of "public schools." There may be a place for boarding schools within the State system, but there is no place for privileged boarding schools without it.

The question of the common school can be similarly dealt with. Many of its opponents at once change the term "common" into "uniform" and drag in the bogey of all children being forced through the same educational process. These lovers of diversity always omit to point out that 90 per cent. of the nation's children do, in fact, attend the primary schools to-day and that if it is uniform this uniformity has been impressed upon it by those in power, who have taken good care to send their own children to some other kind of school. One thing is certain. If in the new Bill there was a clause to the effect that after, say, three or four years, the primary school was to become the common school, those in a position to exercise power would see to it that the conditions at such schools were completely satisfactory. Nor need the fear of uniformity alarm us. Schools will be uniform in the static *authoritarian* state; they will be varied and living in the dynamic democratic one.

Space does not permit of a detailed analysis of each of these proposals. The dual system has meant that in many cases the opportunities available to children have depended upon the accident of the place in which they lived—an intolerable state of affairs. When the church school has been the only school and where the facilities provided have been disgraceful because of the financial inability of the Church to provide others, the children have been at an educational disadvantage, compared with those from areas in which a progressive authority has provided up-to-date schools. Another important question is whether the present multiplicity of schools covering the post-primary range—secondary schools, technical schools, selective and non-selective modern schools—should be allowed to continue, or whether they should be replaced by a new type of many-sided secondary school.

Out of this discussion a definite line of action materialises.

(1) The campaign for what may be termed the "strengthening of the structure" should be vigorously supported. This means more nursery schools, more school meals, another year at school, more adult education, and day continuation schools.

(2) Every opportunity must be taken to help in the removal of obstacles to the growth of a democratic system. This means "soil cleared of the weeds, prepared for growth." It implies the abolition of public and private schools and the termination of the dual system. It is the removal of the privilege of position and wealth from the educational field.

(3) Public opinion must be mobilised in favour of those constructive steps which are the foundation stones of the new system—the common primary school, experiments with the many-sided post-primary school, access by merit alone to the universities, emphasis on the educative aspect from fifteen to eighteen.

No one part of this programme will be satisfactory without the others. We desire to strengthen parts of the present system—for a purpose. We need to remove parts of it—for a purpose. We have to build—to achieve this purpose. The purpose is that to each child there may be open, fully and freely, the opportunity to develop and to use his capabilities in a worth while society. Let us be clear as to our purpose and fight the right battle. The omens were never more favourable. To fail now will be to fail for many years to come.

Production Offensive

by JOHN AUSTIN

HITLER is still powerful. Despite the mauling the Nazis have received from the Red Army, the defeat of Rommel in Egypt and the need to fortify and man many hundreds of miles of additional coastline and strengthen their garrisons in France and other occupied countries, they have still a massive military and industrial machine. While the United Nations have overtaken the Axis in aircraft production, we are not necessarily making the pace in tanks—in terms of quantity or quality—and the rate of output of U-boats still exceeds the rate of sinkings. Millions of Hitler's slaves still toil for him in his huge European arsenal, the nearest to the battlefronts. Despite America's large output of arms, and her even greater potential output, everything produced in the United States has to be transported across the ocean before it can be used against the enemy.

Britain's output is still the decisive factor. The flow of planes, tanks, guns and ammunition from Britain's factories, of coal from her pits and vessels from her shipyards, is more than ever necessary to sustain the offensive in Africa, in the Soviet Union and to ensure the success of future offensives to be opened in Europe. Prospect of the final expulsion of the Axis from Africa must be the signal not for any relaxation of our industrial effort but for its great intensification. The main offensive in the West is still to come, the maximum drain on supplies is ahead. Quite a narrow margin in weapons might mean all the difference between early complete victory and many additional months of war. It might mean all the difference between saving or sacrificing many thousands of precious lives.

With the peak of both the military and production struggle in front of us, a superhuman effort is demanded of the working class. It is not simply a question of each individual intensifying his or her own production effort on the job. The task is rather more complicated and difficult. As there is a sign of the turning of the tide, the ruling class is concerned more and more with post-war problems and prospects. The discordant sound of the shuffling for vantage points grows

louder. Rival industrial groupings are jockeying for position in the race to cash in on the peace. The employing class as a whole is manoeuvring to strengthen its hand against the wage earners. Unchecked, these intrigues can seriously hamper the war effort. It is the responsibility of the working class to see that war output does not suffer, by its unity, solidarity and singleness of purpose, to impose on the ruling class the same wartime discipline to which the working class itself submits. The sole important aim over the next crucial months is to maximise the output of war materials, even though it may be necessary in some cases to tolerate substantially higher profits for the bosses.

While the spotlight centres on the various post-war proposals published—the big business manifesto (blueprint for a corporative Britain) the conflicts over the Beveridge, Uthwatt and similar reports—less publicised moves are afoot by which this or that section or monopoly group is struggling to preserve its privileges or endeavouring to widen or strengthen its grip on the reins of economic power.

Among the most obvious is the determined effort of some colliery owners to undermine and discredit the quite sound and progressive Government coal scheme. Anyone who has carefully followed the course of events since the spring—from the sabotage of fuel rationing to the sly "acceptance" of the Government proposals, the appointment of "safe" owners' men in the majority of the control jobs and the campaign of slander against the miners—is amazed that a serious breakdown of the supply of coal for the war effort has been so far avoided. Because of Excess Profits Tax many owners, on simple financial grounds, don't want to raise more coal—especially from the more productive seams. Transcending immediate financial interest is the fear that if any scheme along the lines of the wartime control proves a success, it will lead to nationalisation after the war. Hence the attempts to "prove" that all shortcomings are due to absenteeism (undoubtedly serious though this is) the

owners' indifference to generous Government offers to mechanise their pits, their resistance to the pooling of mechanical spares, to the most economical use of timber and other supplies. Hence the glee with which they encourage the men's natural reluctance to transfers, which are necessary if labour is to be concentrated on the most productive pits and districts; their determination to obstruct the functioning of the pit committees. Even so, the obstructionists are being outwitted. In laying their plans they reckoned without the will to victory of the working miner, backed by workers in other industries. Where the miners have fully realised the need for more coal and have been solidly determined to get it, nothing has been able to stand in the way. The pit committee has proved the undoing of the plans of the reactionaries. An excellent draft constitution for pit committees has been drawn up by the Ministry of Fuel, which can, and must, be universally enforced. Where committees have begun to function—often after a struggle—on sound lines, it has been proved that the coal plan can be made to work. In some districts targets are being reached and exceeded and the regional controllers stimulated to get on with their end of the job. A big drive by the militant miners to get a wider understanding throughout the coalfields can rout the reactionaries and put the miners in a powerful position to make their views count when victory is won.

There is also a stirring on the railways where the company men in control seem to be primarily concerned with post-war considerations. Wartime rail transport is left to the Railway Executive Committee, dominated by representatives of the companies, who make no secret of their fear of post-war nationalisation. The R.E.C. should be strengthened by the inclusion of rail trade unionists. Its reluctance to make changes fully to adapt the railways to war needs is manifested at every turn—from the preservation of first class carriages to the attitude to wages and women. The last two are closely linked, since without a radical change in the approach to wage questions it is difficult or impossible to introduce the full wartime complement of women workers. It is vital for the final offensive phase of the war that the men who can be replaced

by women should be released without delay. This attitude to women goes hand in hand with a rather negative attitude to the war and the weakness of the existing joint machinery for dealing with production and running efficiency. Although the Local Departmental Committees have the necessary powers, these are not being used at all widely. Hence there is not yet any real drive on the job. The companies have not been forced to set up proper training schools for new entrants. There are many aspects of rail work in which bonus payments could be introduced to stimulate output and raise earnings. In other cases the workers could ensure that the schemes operated more efficiently by utilizing the existing machinery for making adjustments. Countless minor inefficiencies are allowed to persist unchallenged. As in other industries, the companies will make the necessary changes only if there is sufficient pressure from below to force them to do so. As in other industries, the main pressure can only spring from collective initiative on the job. In the relatively few places where the L.D.C.'s are exercising their power to act as joint production committees things are beginning to happen. But on the whole the position is disappointing.

Over the past twelve months tremendous progress has been made in some of the direct armament industries, where the principle of the joint consultative production committee has been fully accepted by the Government, and the Trades Union Congress and has been widely established in practice. But nothing like maximum output has been achieved in, for example, aircraft, tanks, ships. Government spokesmen openly admit it. The workers in these industries can see for themselves. Why is this?

One reason is undoubtedly the uneven development of production committees usually due to resistance on the part of the management who, like the colliery owners, fear the consequences of workers' participation, especially in the post-war period. This resistance is encouraged, directly or indirectly, by the parallel struggle for vantage points that is going on in and around the production ministries.

On October 2 it was announced that Sir George Usher had "resigned" his post

as Director-General of Fighting Vehicle Supply. Usher is a "Beaverbrook man" and followed his chief when Beaverbrook transferred from M.A.P. to Supply.

Sir Andrew Duncan, Minister of Supply—the man who built the steel monopoly, the leading figures in which are closely associated with shipbuilding (Lithgow, merchant shipbuilding chief at the Admiralty and President of the Steel Federation) and with the aircraft and machine tool rings—replaced Usher by Commander Micklem of Vickers.

At a dinner given in honour of Sir George on November 19, Beaverbrook showered on him fulsome praise as the man who doubled Britain's tank production in six months and, before that, helped to supply the aeroplanes to win the Battle of Britain. Present, too, was Lord Nuffield, who has had much-publicised differences with both the steel monopoly and the aircraft ring. The dinner, with speeches, was fully reported in the *Daily Express*. Maybe Usher, like Beaverbrook, had outlived his usefulness at the Ministry.

Ex-employees of the same set of heavy industrialists (steel and aluminium monopolists cum aircraft ring) as controllers easily survived Beaverbrook's meteoric passage through M.A.P. But under-production in some of the leading aircraft factories is becoming too glaring to be glossed over by rosy speeches. Pressure from the workers in an industry where their leadership is outstandingly energetic and class-conscious has brought more than one result which has startled the monopolists. They realise that Cripps is something of a cuckoo in the nest.

Churchill probably intends him to be. The workers must see that he is. When Llewellyn went to Washington it was officially admitted that aircraft production, although good, was not as big as it could and should be. The workers don't need to be told how true this is. In his speeches—boosting production commit-

tees and trade unionism—and his much-publicised action in replacing the management of a certain large "ring" firm, Cripps has shown that he appreciates the need to ally himself closely with the workers. He must see that the principle is extended to the factories producing the materials for aircraft production—aluminium and steel alloys, parts and components. If production of aircraft is to be maximised there is no room for bottlenecks in backwaters of the industry.

He must overhaul the Ministry's rigid schedules, which in many aircraft factories are blocking the workers' best endeavours to raise output and sack those responsible for this hampering policy. He must see that when changing over to new types, all factories do the job as efficiently as the best.

He must be tougher with recalcitrant and inefficient managements, replacing them if necessary under his extensive legal powers.

Another, if less obvious, ally of the workers in their struggle to maximise war production is the Minister of Production. Lyttelton, financier and head of the base metal monopoly, is not, perhaps, the ideal choice. But the post was created in response to strong popular pressure and Lyttelton, member of the War Cabinet, has wide overriding powers to supervise the production departments and curb the excesses of sectional self-seeking which are hampering production. Moreover, he has demonstrated his willingness to exercise these powers by setting up regional machinery which—although, like the coal machinery, not everywhere too happily manned—is definitely on the right lines. The fact that there is no love lost between Lyttelton's department and the bosses of the steel, shipbuilding, aircraft and machine tool monopolies, who thoroughly resent any overlord, is encouraging. In some respects Lyttelton and his former interests represent a threat to the long-

INDEX TO 1942

THE INDEX TO VOLUME XXIV for the year 1942 of the **LABOUR MONTHLY**, divided according to authors and subjects, is now ready.

The index will be sent to individual readers on receipt at the **LABOUR MONTHLY** office of a stamped (2½d.) addressed foolscap envelope.

established industrial domination of heavy industry.

The wrong men are still in certain jobs. The machinery for relating production to strategy seems to be working fairly well. But in day-to-day co-ordination the production departments do not operate as smoothly as they might. The recent appointment of Sir Percy Mills as head of a progressing department of the Ministry of Production is a step in the right direction, but something rather stronger seems to be necessary. There is every indication that each of the supply departments is still jealous of its autonomy and resents having to discuss with outsiders whether, for example, some aspect of the shell or chemical warfare programme is not, may be temporarily, out of focus. The possible loss through wasted materials and man-power is obvious. The Minister of Production requires to exert his overriding authority and force the supply ministries—which must be left to do the day-to-day executive work—to come together in order fully to co-ordinate and dovetail their activities.

The regional boards, on the other hand, are very nearly everything that progressive opinion asked for in the dark days of almost universal cost-plus and sub-contract chaos. They can be made to work. But it is idle to expect a man like Lyttelton to ask the workers for support against his rival industrialists. At the same time it is fairly clear that, like Cripps, he will fail unless he gets that support. If not he, at least some of his lieutenants may not be unaware of it. His Regional Division, headed by N. V. Kipping, is strong in technicians without much political acumen; but one or two of the controllers, in their anxiety to succeed, have shown a refreshing readiness to pay almost as much attention to what the shop stewards say as to the employers' point of view.

The Ministry of Production has been the butt of internal obstruction and external misrepresentation. Questioned by Sir Walter Citrine in October, Kipping had to admit that the regional boards were not getting full co-operation from the general run of officials in the production departments. A whispering campaign, fanned by the obstructionists, to discredit the Ministry of Production, has been the more successful since the Mini-

stry has been uncertain where to turn for support. The most inept, and perhaps pathetic, example of all was the attempt to launch the new drive for adjusting load to capacity at the gathering, where Citrine asked this question, of small engineering employers loosely organised in the Engineering Industries Association.

Those who must understand what Kipping is trying to do, and when they do understand will back him up with real working class drive and initiative, are the workers. Moreover, he must have the workers' support. With it he can easily overcome the obstruction of a few profiteering sub-contractors. Without it the workers, who are not just pawns in a game, are liable to misunderstand and sometimes resist.

The approach of the Regional Division has been such that it is doubtful if even the majority of the leading shop stewards in engineering really understand what the regional boards are trying to do. Lyttelton insists—and this is a real step forward—that the work must be brought to the workers, not vice versa. Hence the need to transfer whole factories out of the congested areas, along with a few key personnel, and set them up where there is a pool of unused green labour.

More important, in any given area the need is to concentrate all the orders on the efficient plants. This means controlling the placing of sub-contracts. For the purpose, each region has set up regional and district capacity offices which keep up-to-date records of the capacity and "load" of every firm in the area. Main contractors and Government departments wishing to place orders are invited—later they may be obliged—to consult the capacity office before placing the order and will be directed to the most suitable firms. Obviously this may cause difficulties, but these can be overcome on the basis of making the fullest use of the best plants while at the same time finding means to utilize every ounce of productive capacity in the country.

Here is a move to raise production which should, and must, fire the imagination of every worker. It is the sort of thing we were demanding at the very outset. If it is effectively carried through it means the end of the sub-sub-contract racket, the elimination of the "mushroom" backyard workshop and an oppor-

tunity for scores of thousands to double and treble their output. But only the united drive of the workers in the engineering industry can ensure that the plan is fully effective. The chain of devolution still lacks many links. In an excellent "quiz" prepared to explain to trade unionists how the rather complicated regional production machinery works, the T.U.C. stresses the overriding importance of a joint production committee in every engineering works of any size. The pamphlet explains the role of the Trade Union District Production Committees which is, on the one hand, to foster J.P.C.s and supervise their setting up and, on the other, to pass on to the Regional Board or National Advisory Committee problems that cannot otherwise be settled. But there are, as yet, only about fifty Trade Union District Committees, out of a possible one hundred and fifty, in existence. Even so, the T.U.C. reports that there are now over 2,000 large engineering works with J.P.C.s, embracing nearly 2,000,000 workers, meeting regularly. Over 600 J.P.C.s are known to exist in smaller firms employing fewer than 150 workers.

In linking up with the Regional Boards to carry through the "loading" plan, it will be necessary for the workers, as always, to take the initiative. Being composed predominantly of representatives of the employing class, the boards are un-

likely to ask for the workers' co-operation; but they can hardly refuse it if it is offered in an organised way. Indeed, they cannot do their job without it. We should not be put off by the complications and difficulties. That is just what the obstructionists desire. That is why the workers must insist on playing their full part.

Experience has shown what can be achieved on the job when joint production committees operate with the full backing of the mass of the workers. Good results multiplied when official approval was won for this machinery. To wring the last ounce of production out of our war factories the mass drive must now extend to a district and regional scale. This is the way not only to overcome the resistance of sectional interests to necessary changes like the redistribution of orders and other adjustments, but also to ensure that the unbiased judgment and commonsense of the working class is more widely applied to matters of wider national concern. Such vital questions as anomalies and injustices in wages and obstruction from the monopoly-dominated controls will become easier of solution the greater the influence on production of the organised workers in the districts and regions. There is no need to stress the importance of this influence on the shaping of post-war industrial policy. The machinery is there. Let us use it and make certain of victory this year.

Youth and Politics

by MICK BENNETT

SHORTLY after the outbreak of war the Government, through the Board of Education, launched a scheme called "The Service of Youth." It was launched largely in anticipation of an increase in juvenile delinquency among boys and immorality among girls; both of which were serious problems during the last war. It is designed as an extension of the educational system of the country, and to provide activities for young people. In the main, the idea has been to develop clubs and centres to "keep young people off the streets." County and borough authorities were requested, through their Education Committees, to set up Local Youth Committees to investigate the facilities available for youth,

to plan youth centres, and to give assistance and secure the co-operation of the youth organisations in their locality. In addition, various practical youth service activities developed; such as Youth Service Squads, youth work in connection with civil defence; and later on the development of pre-service training organisations such as the Air Training Corps, and Girls' Training Corps.

About a year ago, as the Service of Youth had made very little headway, the Government decided to register all youth between the ages of sixteen and eighteen. Interviews were organised to follow up the registration, and young people were encouraged at these interviews to join some youth organisation. To-day, ap-

proximately 50 per cent. of the country's youth are in some organisation, as compared with 10 per cent. in pre-war days. Of the rest, many work long hours, or are otherwise unable to participate in available facilities.

Nevertheless, a very large percentage who could be organised remain outside of any organisation, and many who are in organisations are only so in name, and not in active spirit.

One would imagine that in view of these shortcomings, official encouragement would be given to *every* youth organisation to grow, and to all youth organisations to get together, co-operate with each other, and be represented either on the Local Youth Committees or on special Youth Councils sponsored by such Committees (this latter is the case in some parts of the country). Where such democratic machinery and initiative is encouraged a far healthier position exists than in other parts of the country.

The President of the Board of Education (Mr. Butler) doesn't see it that way. On the contrary, he seems determined to sow discord among youth, to divide youth into two categories, the "politically minded" and the "non - politically minded" and to keep the first lot out of the "Service of Youth." In reply to a question in the House about the status of the political youth organisations, Mr. Butler recently stated:—

I regard it as undesirable that political youth organisations should be admitted to the registers of youth groups kept by authorities, and in no circumstances should the follow up of registration be permitted to be used as a medium for recruiting young people to such organisations.

In other words, the political youth organisations are not to be regarded as youth organisations, and youth are to be discouraged from joining them, and if they do join them, then they are not recognised as having joined a youth organisation within the meaning of that term under the Service of Youth. This is in direct contradiction to the pledge given by Mr. Pevin, Minister of Labour, in Parliament, at the time the Youth Registration Bill was introduced. He stated then, in reply to a question, that *all* youth organisations were encouraged to develop, that there was nothing to prevent all political parties and Trade Unions from developing youth organisations, and what

the Government desired was the greatest possible variety.

Mr. Butler has, however, decided to apply a "Black Circular" to the Youth Movement.

The more far-thinking sections of the press have been quick to see the danger in this division of youth into two categories, political and non-political. The *Times Educational Supplement*, in commenting on Mr. Butler's reply, points out:—

If political youth organisations, including, presumably, those sponsored by trade unions, are to be excluded from official recognition and denied financial assistance, an invidious distinction may be drawn between politically minded youth and non-politically minded. That could easily lead to the driving underground of political education. But democracy is, and must be, based on party politics. If these are to be banished from youth organisations, where, in existing circumstances, is the adolescent to obtain adequate education for democratic citizenship.

In Stratford (London) where Mr. Butler's reply led to the immediate removal of the Young Communist League from the Local Youth Committee, the *Stratford Express*, in an editorial pointed out:—

Having regard to the comprehensive character of these components, it is not easy to reconcile the Board's decision to exclude youth political organisations. Whether it was Junior Imps, Young Britons, Young Liberals, Young Socialists or Young Communists, their political activities were probably more apparent in name than in practice, and their social work is far more real. So long as affiliation was open to ALL political youth associations, and not merely to such as might be approved from time to time by the governing body, there could not be any grave risk of offending the susceptibilities of some of its components. If such bodies are to be outside the pale, it limits the scope of the movement and excludes many young people from its influence. No one would want to see the youth movement become political, but politics are an important matter in the nation's life, and it might well be for the nation's good that its future politicians of all parties should start their careers banded together in a common organisation. It might lead to more understanding of, and sympathy with, the opposition view.

In what sense are youth organisations "political"? *In an educational sense, in that their philosophy and principles applied to current reality produces certain activities which have political significance.*

The youth organisations are not junior political parties, as Mr. Butler perhaps falsely imagines. Take, for example, the Young Communist League.

The Young Communist League is not a Junior Communist Party, is not a section of the Communist Party, nor is it affiliated to the Communist Party. *It is an independent organisation of youth.* It is, however, spiritually bound to the Communist Party by virtue of the fact that the system of society which the Communist Party ultimately strives for is ideal from the point of view of the Communist conception of citizenship and democracy, in which the Y.C.L. trains its members.

The Y.C.L. is an educational organisation of youth. Its main function is "to learn." All youth organisations primarily have this function, and the Service of Youth itself is a public educational system. But there are different conceptions of education and learning. The Y.C.L. is not a continuation school in the academic sense, nor does it aim to teach by rote, or solely by classes. There is nothing of the school atmosphere about its educational role. The Y.C.L. learns its Communist conception of citizenship by linking its outlook to practical daily effort, by practising what it preaches: for instance, in its defence of the conditions of young workers, and encouraging them to join Trade Unions; and again, by helping to develop emulation in industry, which in itself is a great education in production, the basis of citizenship. It does extensive voluntary service on farms, salvage, fitness activity, cultural work, etc. By this constant harmony of theory and practice, it fulfils its chief purpose, which is to train youth in citizenship, the Communist conception of citizenship. By doing so it also renders a great service to the war effort, which is itself the biggest political issue of our times. There is nothing "non-political" about the war against Fascism. Is an organisation which has rendered such youth service as initiating the emulation in industry movement to be "outside the pale"?

Other youth organisations go about things in different ways. Their conceptions of citizenship vary according to their political, religious or philosophical world outlook. All perform a useful role in one way or another. All have something worth while to contribute to the common pool of experience and youthful endeavour. But is this difference of conception and method a valid reason for victimising certain organisations merely

because they have a certain conception of citizenship and adopt certain methods and principles in their education and training of youth? According to Mr. Butler, a lad or girl who joins a "political" youth organisation and thus continues his or her education in this manner and helps his or her country and people, is not playing his or her part in the Service of Youth.

In other youth organisations a sufficient number of full time organisers is allowed to be reserved, but not so with political youth organisations. They must do without.

Is it possible for British youth to be trained in a spirit of democratic citizenship if political youth are so victimised? No, it is quite impossible. Politics are the science of government. There can be no science of government, no citizenship, without politics; it would be mere anarchy, a jungle.

If youth are to be "warned off" politics, how can they learn to be democratic citizens? Can anyone learn to swim without entering the water? Any scheme which drives out the political youth, which reduces citizenship to a few abstract phrases about "higher duties" and which at the same time neglects the vital daily interests of youth, opens up the dangerous path to Fascism and cannot but create the conditions which gave rise to such plans as the recent Tory plan for youth.

British youth can no more stand aside from the politics of to-day than they can from the war. The whole future of youth is dependent upon the outcome of the present war between the politics of Fascism and the politics of Freedom.

Youth cannot be forced into a position of "non-intervention," which is really what "no politics" means. Each organisation in its own internal life can please itself as to what attitude it adopts to politics and citizenship training. No organisation wants to force its conceptions or methods upon another, though they may debate and argue relative merits. But within the youth movement as a *whole* there must be a place for all democratic political youth organisations, just as there is a place for all religious youth organisations and cultural organisations.

The Service of Youth must be made into a genuine, public educational institution. Every organisation of youth must be recognised. In every area democratic machinery must be established by the Local

Youth Committees whereby all local youth organisations may be represented, place their point of view on all questions which come within the sphere of the Service of Youth, and in that way assist each other, obtain a greater understanding of each other's problems, and strengthen British democracy.

The "Service" is a good framework. With the right spirit and assistance it could be a really great Public Youth Institution. For example, the Education Committee for the County Council of Middlesex has a printed constitution for the guidance of local youth committees which states:—

"The purpose of the Committee shall be to promote the mental, moral, physical and social welfare of young people.

In order to achieve its purpose the Committee shall undertake all or any of the following objects:—

- (1) To stimulate local interest and public opinion about all questions affecting the welfare of young people, and to secure that so far as possible they have every opportunity of becoming healthy, happy and useful citizens.
- (2) To ascertain the needs of young people, to survey and record how far these needs are being met by existing organisations, to strengthen existing activities, to suggest the lines upon which new work should be undertaken and to assist in its development.
- (3) To bring all local organisations formed for the purpose of welfare work amongst young people into touch with each other and with the local statutory authorities so

as to secure mutual help and avoid overlapping and waste of effort.

- (4) To obtain, collect and receive money and funds by way of contributions, subscriptions, grants or legacies, and to receive gifts of property of any description for or towards the objects of the Committee, or any of them."

This can be said to be the objects of the whole "Service of Youth," but they will remain so only "on paper" until this Service is made into a democratic, all-embracing institution and until the Labour movement adds its authority and leadership to this work.

The Labour movement has a great responsibility. The Labour movement can no longer stand aside from the youth problems of to-day, or from the youth movement. The Trades Union Congress, in adopting its educational policy, has taken a great step forward along the right road. The new District Youth Committees established by the Amalgamated Engineering Union show a serious attitude to the problem. These steps are only the first. It is now the duty of the Labour movement in the localities, especially the Trades Councils, to interest themselves in the activities of the Local Youth Committees, to seek representation on these Committees, to help unite the broadest sections of the Labour and youth organisations, to bring pressure to bear upon the Government for a revision of the Service of Youth Scheme into this all-embracing movement. "Unity in Service for Victory" must be the watchword of the youth of this country.

To our Readers :—

We deeply regret the inconvenience caused by the heavy restriction of paper supplies in relation to the increasing demand upon all sides.

We would urge readers to make the fullest possible use of every copy.

Ten Years of Fascist Rule in Germany

by ERNST WERNER

TEN years' rule of the Hitlerite clique—what have they made of the German people? They have turned a civilised nation into modern barbarians, they have destroyed the once powerful German Labour movement, they have changed tolerant and cultured people into race fanatics, out of the German youth they have made cold-blooded thieves and murderers, living on booty and plunder. Germany, once an honoured and esteemed member of the community of peoples, has become the dread of the civilised world, an outcast of the nations, loved by no one, but hated and fought by everybody who has normal and decent feelings left in his soul.

This is what ten years of Fascist rule have made of the German people.

It is not enough to say, as the French do, that their nation has been taken by surprise. A nation and a woman are not forgiven the unguarded hour in which the first adventurer that came along could violate them.

—(Marx, 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.)

These words were written by Marx ninety years ago with regard to France. But they hold true also for the German nation. No glossing over the tragic facts of Germany history which brought about this development can be allowed. History does not tolerate easy excuses; it shares out responsibilities to nations and classes from which they cannot escape cheaply. On the German nation, and particularly on the German working class, rests a heavy responsibility indeed for the past ten and twenty years. The lesson has to be learned if the painful experiences of these years are not to be lost, if the end of the war is to be the beginning of a lasting period of peace, and if the German people are to win real freedom and a true national rebirth.

* * *

The last war ended for imperial Germany not only with military defeat; it ended with a great popular uprising which swept aside the forces of the past, the Kaiser and his feudal lords. But the revolutionary forces were still weak.

The state of siege of Paris was the *accoucheur* of the Constituent Assembly in its travail of republican creation. If the Constitution is subsequently

put out of existence by bayonets, it must not be forgotten that it was likewise by bayonets, and these turned against the people, that it had to be protected in its mother's womb and by bayonets that it had to be brought into existence.

(Marx, 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.)

As in France in 1848 so in Germany seventy years later in 1918. The Weimar Republic was given birth to with the help of the bayonets of the White Guards under the command of the most reactionary generals. No wonder the power of heavy industry was left untouched; the Krupps and Thyssens, who had enriched themselves enormously out of the misery of war, and who, for a short while, disappeared from the surface of events, yet who stood behind every reactionary movement in Germany. Step by step they took back their power, they infiltrated the democratic institutions of the republic with their spirit and with their personnel.

To destroy democracy in Germany was not difficult for the Nazis because it had been undermined bit by bit. Fascism came to power, the republic was broken up by the same reactionary forces, by the same bayonets which had helped to give it birth.

* * *

Fascism in Germany did not come to power "out of necessity," as a "natural development." It might have been prevented. Working-class unity, powerful united action of the Labour movement would have been able to prevent it. This is the first and most important lesson to be learned from the history of German Fascism. And here, too, lies the heaviest responsibility of the German working class. For the failure to fulfil the basic task of establishing working-class unity the German working class had, and still has, to pay a fearful price.

Hundreds of thousands of the most determined and most courageous proletarian fighters were murdered or slowly tortured to death in concentration camps and prisons. All working-class rights, all democratic liberties, were annihilated. All progressive organisations were disbanded and their remnants driven underground. All humanitarian thought was killed. A net of terror and spying, of death and

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humiliation, of mental and physical starvation, was tied over Germany.

The "German Revolution," as the Nazis would call their ascent to power, conquered every sphere of life. From the burning of the Reichstag to the introduction of the "Race Laws" is a straight road. And behind it all stood German heavy industry. It established the firmest grip on the state apparatus a section of the bourgeoisie had ever had in any country, subjugating everything to the supreme task of preparing the way for a new attempt at world dominion, decreasing the production of consumption goods to a bare minimum, concentrating every means on war production, reducing the German workers to slaves and serfs. It was the reign of the Iron Heel.

Of course, there were forces of opposition in Germany. First of all there were the masses of the politically conscious workers in the big industrial centres whose living and working conditions had considerably declined, who were deprived of their elementary rights, against whom the Gestapo terror was directed the most strongly, but who had the fighting experience of the trade union and Labour movement. They did not give in as many of their leaders had, but, according to the situation, they came out more or less openly with their fight. They continued their organisations underground, they created a network of illegal papers, they succeeded in fighting—and winning—scores of minor actions, go-slow strikes and resistance movements of every kind. They kept contacts with friends abroad, and the help given to them, for instance, by some British trade unions, represents a brilliant chapter of practical international solidarity.

Side by side with the Socialist, Communist and Catholic workers, fought masses of peasants, office employees, intellectuals, small shopkeepers and independent craftsmen, whose number was fairly big in Germany, and whose conditions had likewise worsened under Fascist rule. To the resistance of these sections, which did not develop evenly, was added the opposition of certain sections of the owning class. They were chiefly dissatisfied elements, not closely connected with the ruling finance-oligarchy, sections of the non-monopolistic consumption goods industries, and mer-

chants who, by the transformation of German economy to war purposes, were prejudiced as against heavy industry and who lost part of their profits.

External events, partly altered since through the alliance of the freedom-loving nations, exercised, of course, a considerable influence on the German opposition movement. The Munich Agreement of 1938, for instance, was a terrible blow to it, and strengthened the Nazis' grip on certain sections of the German people.

The resistance movement in Germany found its zenith in the famous struggle of the workers on the Siegfried Line and in the strikes of the dockyard workers in Northern Germany. These brilliant and successful fights against the Nazi regime justified the highest hopes of the international working class in the German underground opposition, and it was with these hopes that we German anti-Fascists entered the war.

* * *

Yet everything changed, and many of our hopes were destroyed when war broke out. We knew, of course, that war means a certain check to underground activities; that the forces of the movement would be dispersed over the whole of Germany, and that the rebuilding of lost connections would take a long time. We knew, too, that war would mean increased terror against every suspect, that Himmler would open up the "Inner-Germany Battlefield" for the S.S. and Gestapo to fight there with even more drive and ruthlessness than on the various other fronts. And all this, of course, happened.

But what we did not foresee was that the Nazis would really succeed in whipping up an unprecedented wave of chauvinistic feeling among the masses of the German people, that they would succeed in winning over large sections of previously indifferent people and silencing almost the whole of the opposition movement. The Nazis did not achieve this in the first days of the war, but as a rather rapid process, starting as a result of the short and successful campaign in Poland, which was all over so quickly as to seem nothing more than a pleasure stroll, and which led to the "phoney war" of the winter 1939-40. Everything appeared so easy, the German Army invincible and the "Fuehrer" infallible.

This development was accelerated by the successful campaigns in France and the Balkans. The whole world stood open to German conquest, nothing seemed to be left that could withstand it, and the price paid for all this seemed certainly worth while. The German people were bribed on a gigantic scale with plunder from the conquered countries; workers and petty bourgeois could drink champagne from France, which they had never tasted before; office girls wore silk stockings pilfered from French shops; food rations increased at the price of starvation in the oppressed countries.

German heavy and armaments industries reached a new high level by incorporating the whole of the European heavy industries, by taking all machinery to German factories, and herding together in labour camps millions of workers from the occupied countries for forced labour in mines, factories and fields.

The Nazi race theory, the myth of the master-role of the German people, found its practical confirmation in the thoughts of millions of Germans who, better fed and better clad than anybody else, felt themselves superior to all other peoples. War seemed to them a rather pleasant affair, there was no general war-weariness, there was only unlimited chauvinistic intoxication. The warning voice of the opposition was weak and low and was not heard by the mass of the German people.

* * *

When Hitler prepared his treacherous attack on the Soviet Union he deviated from his usual tactics. Each of his previous attacks was preceded by a violent propaganda campaign against the respective country, designed to spur the feelings of the masses against it. Not so in the case of the Soviet Union. There were no hostile feelings in the German against the Socialist State; on the contrary, during the first period of the war Germans still regarded the Soviet Union as a friend, and since the conclusion of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact these feelings had been strengthened. A German underground worker writes:

Hitler's sudden unjust and cynical attack was designed to take unawares not only Soviet Russia but the German people too. His plan was to overwhelm the people and give them no time to

think—to place them face to face with the accomplished fact.*

Goebbels' propaganda offensive started all the more furiously after the first shots were fired. Not only were Russian "atrocities" invented, but the end of the war within six weeks was predicted. The German victories were announced with fanfares on the German radio. Every day whole Russian armies were destroyed—in the German newspapers. Yet the victories on Soviet territory looked different from the former victories. In Poland, Norway and France, whole industries fell into the hands of the German Fascists undamaged. Raw material and food stores, bridges and buildings were captured intact. Quite different in the Soviet Union. All valuable machinery was evacuated to the rear, stores and buildings were destroyed. Nothing which could be of use to German war economy was left untouched where the Red Army withdrew. Guerilla fighters gave no rest to the overstrained German troops. War in the Soviet Union looked different for the German army, casualties grew large, war ceased to be a "pleasant affair."

The first very small signs of war-weariness which appeared in Germany were encountered by the Nazis with more devilish devices than ever. They made the German army commit the most horrible crimes in history, they bestialised millions of Germans, in order to make them feel accomplices of the bloody Nazi criminals and to tie the masses of the soldiers closely to the Nazi monsters. In this they succeeded to a terrible degree. The letters and statements of German soldiers, and the *Soviet Documents on Nazi Atrocities* are sufficient proof of it. If the Nazis' race theory was confirmed in the Germans' minds by Hitler's easy victories, it was put into horrible reality by the indescribable crimes of the German army.

The millions of Germans who did not take part in those deeds, but who shared the guilt by tolerating them without protest, without action against their criminal leadership, are scared to death of the future. Many of them know from their own bitter experience what became of Germany after the last war. They know that the millions of victims of this war are crying for vengeance, that the just hatred

* "Report from Berlin," by a German Communist. I.N.G. Publications Ltd.

of the suffering European peoples will be boundless. And they fear that it will be they, the masses of the people, who will have to foot the bill.

Goebbels is trying hard to exploit these fears by telling the German people: "Together we conquer or go down." There is no such alternative.

The German people must recognise that Hitler has already lost the war, that fatalism and lethargy will not save them, but only courageous action against the Nazi murderers. With Hitler they are driving nearer and nearer a terrible abyss which may swallow all of them. Only by separating themselves from Hitler and his gang, by the most determined fight for his defeat, which will be a real victory for the German people, can they change their own fate.

* * *

Again, unity of the working class and of all progressive anti-Nazi forces is the condition for the successful organisation of this fight. On the one side there are the heavy industrialists and the biggest finance aristocrats, and belonging to them the Hitler, Goering, Himmler, Rosenberg gang. These fight not only for their economic survival but for their very lives.

On the other side there are the workers and peasants, the office employees and civil servants, the intellectuals, small shopkeepers and master craftsmen, there are middle class people and officers, priests and artists. The nearing catastrophe hastens the process of disintegration even among the ruling class. Even there single elements begin to realise that the war is already lost, as is shown in the mass dismissals from the general staff and from sundry speeches of high clergymen.

All these sections must be brought into the joint struggle, not only for the interests of their classes, but in the interest of the German nation as a whole. Those who wage the struggle are as yet a small minority. But it is both necessary and possible to make them the vast majority of the German people. This path is paved with difficulty and sacrifice, but it is the only way out for the German people, the only way that will wipe out the shame of bloody Fascism and lead to a peaceful and happier Germany.

The harder the blows the Allied Nations deal to the Hitlerite army, the nearer the decision of the war draws, the more is the fight of the German people

facilitated; but at the same time the more this fight becomes imperative. That this task is well understood in the organised circles can be seen from the manifesto of the conference of the National Peace Movement in Western Germany, with its programme of struggle:—

1. Immediate end of the military operations. Recall of the German Army to Germany and renunciation of the conquests of foreign territory.

2. Overthrow of the Hitler government and formation of a national democratic peace government.

3. Arrest and punishment of those responsible for the war and confiscation of their property. Disbandment of the S.S. and Gestapo.

4. Liberation of the arrested and convicted clergymen, deputies, party and trade union leaders and those imprisoned by the Hitler government for political activities. Abolition of the concentration camps and of the humiliating racial laws.

5. Freedom of speech, press and assembly, freedom of religion and opinion. Free performance of religious ceremonies. Freedom of political, economic and cultural organisation.

6. Abolition of all economic laws enforced by the Hitler government to the detriment of the people. Restoration of freedom for the peasant households, and handicrafts, freedom of trade. Security and freedom of development for the small and medium enterprises in agriculture, trade and industry. Just distribution of the taxation burden. State aid to the enterprises producing consumers' goods and foreign trade. Constitutional protection of legally acquired private property.

7. Work, fair wages, eight-hour working day, the right to rest for all workers and office employees. Restoration of the former rights of the civil servants. Aid to youth to facilitate their education and development.

8. Adequate state relief and broad relief to the war victims and relatives of the men killed in the war at the expense of confiscating the property of those responsible for the war and of all profiteers and marauders.

9. Foreign policy of international collaboration with the peoples and states. Recognition of the right of all peoples to independence and their own statehood.

10. Convening on the basis of equal and direct suffrage with secret ballot of a new Constituent National Assembly to work out a democratic constitution and create constitutional and material guarantees of rights, law and order.

It is on the basis of this programme that a new Germany can rise with a truly democratic and truly national government, representative not of big business but of the German nation in its entirety. On the basis of this programme it is possible to secure internal and external peace, and genuine well-being for the German people. If the masses of the people realise their historic responsibility, if they act!

Post-War Reconstruction

[A Memorandum prepared by the Central Committee of the Communist Party.]

WHILE emphasising the primary urgency of immediate war tasks for victory, as the condition for all post-war advance, and combating any tendency to replace immediate war issues by discussion of post-war questions, we consider it necessary for the Communist Party to give leadership on all the questions of the future after victory, which are deeply occupying the minds of the masses and affect the will to victory.

The new stage reached in relation to post-war questions, which are no longer mainly the happy hunting-ground of social theorists and cranks as an escape from current war questions, but are now the subject of Government reports, projects of legislation, pronouncements of all political parties, employers' organisations and the Labour movement, and thus take on the character of current political issues, makes essential that the Party give concrete and positive political leadership on these questions, and conduct and or-

ganise campaigns on specific issues as occasion arises.

It would be premature at the present moment, with the outcome of the war still to be decided, and in advance of the concrete situation at the end of hostilities, for the Party to come out with a general programme for the post-war period.

The Party's task of leadership at the present stage in relation to post-war questions is

- (i) To present and win support for the general aims of post-war reconstruction embodied in the agreed declarations of the United Nations;
- (ii) To conduct the necessary day-to-day fight on the concrete specific issues in relation to post-war plans which are in the forefront in the current political situation, such as the Beveridge Report, the Scott and Uthwatt Reports, the Industrialists' Manifesto, the proposed Education Bill, youth policy colonial policy, etc.
- (iii) Alongside this concrete day-to-day leadership, to strengthen our propaganda and educational work for our socialist aims.

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION.

The guiding lines of our approach to questions of post-war reconstruction are governed by the agreed statements of policy embodied in the Atlantic Charter and in the British-Soviet Treaty, further elaborated in the lines of Stalin's speeches, especially the speech of November 6, 1942.

1. *Atlantic Charter*.

1. No aggrandisement, territorial or other.
2. No territorial change without the wishes of the peoples concerned.
3. The restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples deprived of them.
4. To develop access to trade and raw materials by all peoples.
5. To improve labour standards and social security.
6. To establish a peace in which men may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.
7. To enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance.
8. To disarm the aggressor nations pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security.

2. *British-Soviet Treaty*.

Preamble. "Desiring to contribute after the war to the maintenance of peace

and to the prevention of further aggression by Germany or the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe."

"Moreover, to give expression to their intention to collaborate closely with one another as well as with the other United Nations at the peace settlement and during the ensuing period of reconstruction on the basis of the principles enunciated in the declaration made on August 14, 1941" (i.e., the Atlantic Charter).

Part 2, Section 3. "To unite with other like-minded states in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression in the post-war period."

"Pending the adoption of such proposals they will, after the termination of hostilities, take all the measures in their power to render impossible a repetition of aggression and violation of the peace by Germany or the states associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe."

Section 5. "Agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the re-establishment of peace for the organisation of security and economic prosperity

in Europe . . . they will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandisement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states."

- 3. *Stalin's Speech, November 6, 1942.*

Programme. "The programme of action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition is

The abolition of racial exclusiveness.

The equality of nations and the inviolability of their territory.

The liberation of the enslaved nations and the restoration of their sovereign rights.

The right of every nation to arrange its affairs as it wishes.

Economic aid to the nations that have suffered and assistance to them in achieving their material welfare.

The restoration of democratic liberties.

The destruction of the Hitlerite regime."

Tasks.

"Our first task is to destroy the Hitlerite state and its inspirers."

"Our second task is to destroy Hitler's army and its leaders."

II. BRITISH POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION.

The problems of post-war reconstruction in Britain will be profoundly affected by the international situation and by the general policy of international post-war reconstruction outlined above. British reconstruction cannot be considered in isolation, or as if we were returning to 1919 or 1939, but only on the basis of completely new international relationships and common tasks, together with completely new relations of class forces both in the world as a whole and in Britain itself.

The old basis of capitalist economy in Britain has been heavily weakened, with the loss of former markets, the loss of overseas invested capital, a gigantic war debt, the increased relative strength of American imperialism and the prospect of the further advance of the colonial peoples along the path of liberation.

Wider and wider sections of the people are conscious of the need of a change from the old conditions. They do not want to go back to 1939. They are anxious

"Our third task is to destroy the hated 'New Order' in Europe and punish its builders."

In accordance with these general principles, the tasks of the Communist Party of Great Britain in relation to post-war reconstruction are:—

- (1) To popularise these principles of post-war reconstruction.
- (2) To mobilise public opinion in order to combat any steps or policies in conflict with these principles, and to fight for all suitable steps in pursuance of these principles.
- (3) To knit and organise the strength and unity of the Labour movement and of all democratic anti-Fascist forces and progressive opinion so as to be capable of ensuring the carrying out of these principles.
- (4) To put forward positive immediate proposals and policies in relation to all current issues of post-war reconstruction in specific fields, projects of legislation, etc. (social insurance, housing, agriculture, education, youth, etc.) and to conduct an active campaign for such policies.
- (5) To fight against monopoly capitalist attempts to prepare reactionary policies of post-war reconstruction at the expense of the workers and of democratic interests.
- (6) To carry on propaganda for the reconstruction of economy on socialist lines, which alone can fully realise the aims set out in these principles.

not to go back to a world of unemployment, slumps, declining industries and the dole. They demand a new Britain and a new world. They are looking for social advance in accordance with the possibilities of modern productive technique and democratic conceptions. The Government, the political parties and leaders, and spokesmen of all sections, including those of the big industrialists, hold out promises of a new Britain after the war, while at the same time assuming the continuance of the basis of monopoly capitalism.

Wartime organisation has carried forward the concentration of monopoly capital, the weakening of small and medium businesses, and the domination by the big monopolies through the State controls. The state machinery has been extended and strengthened in all spheres of economic life. The workers, for the sake of the united national war effort, have made considerable temporary sacrifices of basic rights, the right to strike, freedom of movement and transfer of

labour, etc., while at the same time they have won definite advantages in respect of wages and conditions, the guaranteed week, extended trade union recognition and recognition of shop stewards, participation in production committees, etc.

Only a powerful coalition of progressive forces, with corresponding forms of government, will be able to ensure that the new forms of state control and organisation, opened up by wartime organisation, shall be carried forward and developed (as already indicated in preliminary form in the *Memorandum on Production*) not for strengthening monopoly capitalism, but for strengthening democratic and social advance.

The problems of reconstruction in Britain will be grave, and their successful solution will depend in great part on the international agreements reached and their effective carrying out. There will be immediate problems of demobilisation and transference from a war to a peace basis; of physical reconstruction, rebuilding the shattered areas, housing and town planning, and restoration of industrial plant for peace needs. There will be the wider problems of the altered British economy to the new world conditions. This will raise far-reaching questions of the organisation of industry and agriculture, of international policy and colonial policy; and the prospect of sharp conflict between the monopoly capitalists demanding lowered standards in order to

re-establish the export position, and the demands of the people for social advance.

When the time comes to mobilise the people in order to grapple with these problems the Communist Party will put forward its concrete programme of measures for meeting the needs of British post-war reconstruction, both for the immediate transition from war to peace, and for measures to meet the new conditions.

The degree and speed of advance which can be achieved will depend on the strength, unity and leadership of the working class and progressive forces. The organised strength of the working-class movement has greatly extended during the war to now over six millions in the Trades Union Congress. The social and political consciousness of the masses, dissatisfaction with the old order and demand for changes has also advanced. These are great positive factors, provided unity and effective leadership can be achieved. But there is still lacking unity of the Labour movement; and there is still lacking clearness of aim, policy and leadership.

Our main need in preparation for post-war tasks is thus to build up the unity and strength and effective political role of the Labour and democratic forces already during the war on present issues, both on the immediate issues of the war and in relation to the post-war plans and measures now being put forward.

III. MONOPOLY CAPITALIST POLICY.

The monopoly capitalist interests are preparing their demands and active campaign in relation to post-war reconstruction. Their policy has found expression in the Industrialists' Manifesto, in the Memorandum of the British Employers' Confederation to the Beveridge Committee, in the declaration of Sir Patrick Hannon, President of the National Union of Manufacturers, and similar statements.

Their main lines of campaign concentrate on two principal issues:—

- (1) In respect of the organisation of industry, they attack State control or nationalisation, and demand as an alternative the strengthening of monopoly capitalist organisation through new statutory corporate forms of organisation, in association with the State, but independent of State interference or interference by democratic organs; and they seek to draw in the trade unions as junior partners in the new system.

- (2) In respect of the British economic position, they stress the importance of exports and the dependence on imports, and the prospective disappearance of the nearly £350 million of "invisible exports" which previously paid for nearly half the imports; hence they insist on the necessity of roughly doubling British exports, to about £1,000 million a year, to maintain the old level of imports, and for this purpose demand the lowering of the costs of production to restore the competitive efficiency of British industry. This policy in fact represents an offensive to lower the standard of living, and cut wages and social services, as the supposed means to restore British capitalist industry.

This is a policy of reconstruction of British capitalism at the expense of the workers and the masses of the people. The unity of the Labour movement and all progressive sections needs to resist this policy, and fight for the constructive

alternative policy which is possible on the basis of placing first the interests of the masses of the people against the interests of monopoly capital.

IV.

PRESENT GOVERNMENT POLICY.

The Government has declared its support of the Atlantic Charter as the basis of post-war policy, and has ratified the British-Soviet Treaty.

The main line of ministerial declarations, alongside general expressions of aspirations for a better Britain, has emphasised the necessity of continued national unity after the war, the co-operation of classes and parties, the necessity of compromise, with the Left forgoing demands for radical changes and the Right making concessions, and the desirability of avoiding "controversial" legislation, *i.e.*, legislation challenging the main social and economic foundations of the *status quo*.

The concrete policy of the Government in relation to post-war reconstruction has been directed to (1) preparation of measures for international economic restoration and relief to devastated countries in Europe; (2) preparation of technical measures for demobilisation and the immediate transition from war to peace; (3) preparation of measures of reform in special fields.

A series of committees have been set up to conduct surveys and prepare reports and recommendations. The principal reports which have appeared are the Beveridge Report on social insurance and social services; the Scott and Uthwatt Reports on land utilisation and development rights in relation to planning; and the Vivian Report on electoral machinery. A Ministry of Town and Coun-

try Planning is to be established. An Export Trade Committee has been set up under the Board of Trade. Negotiations have taken place on the proposed Education Bill. Negotiations under the Board of Agriculture are announced on post-war agricultural policy. Sir William Jowitt is preparing to meet the employers and the Trades Union Congress with regard to future policy in industry.

On the majority of issues and reports already published no decisions of policy have so far been announced by the Government ("no decisions" was the main tenor of Sir William Jowitt's report on December 2 on practically every issue).

Our general attitude to the various post-war reform measures of the Government will correspond to our general attitude to all reform measures—to fight for the maximum progressive advance, to oppose all reactionary tendencies and to put forward our constructive proposals. At the same time we show that these reform measures cannot solve the basic problems of achieving a new Britain after the war.

It is evident that the actual character of the various Government decisions or projects for legislation arising at the present stage in relation to post-war reconstruction will in practice reflect the relations of forces, and the degree of strength of progressive pressure and reactionary pressure. This has been already illustrated in relation to the education controversy, and is being further illustrated in relation to the Beveridge Report.

Hence the importance of the positive leadership of the Party on these issues and the strengthening of the progressive campaign.

V. LEADERSHIP OF THE POSITIVE FIGHT ON CONCRETE ISSUES.

This political situation governs our immediate approach to post-war issues at the present stage. The strength of the campaign of the party, of the Labour movement and of the broad democratic movement, will determine the pace of advance, to hasten the action of the Government, to secure the maximum democratic and progressive character of the measures adopted, and to defeat the reactionary campaigns and proposals.

The main practical task of the party in relation to the questions of post-war reconstruction at this stage is to give con-

crete leadership on the day-to-day issues which are already being fought and decided in relation to post-war reconstruction. These cover at present especially:—

1. Beveridge Report (social insurance and social services).
2. Barlow, Scott and Uthwatt Reports (land utilisation and planning).
3. Industrialists' Manifesto (a national policy for industry).
4. Education Bill.
5. Youth policy.
6. Colonial questions.
7. Electoral Reform.

Others which may come to the forefront in the future include:—

8. Demobilisation.
9. Local Government.
10. Women in Industry.
11. Restoration of Trade Union Rights.
12. Housing.
13. Food and Agriculture.

Our leadership on these questions should be concrete and immediate, presenting the positive demands on the basis of which the working class and democratic movement can unite and play an effective part in the present line-up of forces and shaping of policy.

The policy on each of these issues requires to be worked out by the party leadership in fuller detail on the basis of the special reports in preparation, and presented in suitable forms. Education has been already covered in the report adopted and newly published. Agriculture is to a certain extent covered by the lines of our *Agricultural Memorandum*.

VI. POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE IN BRITAIN AFTER THE WAR.

Concerning the political situation in Britain at the close of the war, we can only say in principle:—

- (1) That we should aim to carry forward the widest measure of unity and collaboration of all sections of the people, who have fought together against Fascism, to go forward together in the post-war period for democratic and social advance and against monopoly capitalist reaction.
- (2) That unity of the Labour movement is of decisive importance for making possible the broadest progressive unity.

* * *

Finally, we need to stress the unity of the war and the post-war situation; there can be no sharp dividing line. We need to warn against over-confidence, as a result

Statements are in preparation on the Beveridge Report, and on the Barlow, Scott and Uthwatt Reports. A statement is also in preparation on Youth policy.

Our general principles of approach to these questions are governed by the aims (1) to secure the maximum democratic and social advance; (2) to weaken the position of monopoly capital and all reactionary forces; (3) to protect the conditions of the workers and of the masses of the people, and to ensure that the burdens of the war and of post-war reconstruction shall as far as possible be placed, not on the shoulders of the workers, but on the rich.

In the practical leadership of the fight on these concrete post-war issues we can build up a very broad front of the working class and democratic movement (for example, on the Beveridge Report) and in this way strengthen the unity and political activity of the popular forces in readiness for the post-war situation.

of the present concentration of public attention on post-war questions.

Two facts need to be burned into public consciousness in all our propaganda and treatment of post-war issues:—

First, victory over Fascism is the condition for all further advance, without which all talk of post-war reconstruction is meaningless; and therefore the first task is to do everything for victory over Fascism.

Second, the strength, unity and readiness of the working class and democratic forces in responding to the present tasks of the war not only prepares the most favourable conditions for the post-war situation, but will also determine their strength to go forward to the most rapid further advance after the war.

The Editor of LABOUR MONTHLY will be very glad to receive contributions in the form of finished articles or of suggestions and data for articles. The customary proviso must be made that no responsibility is undertaken for manuscripts sent to him nor can he promise to enter into correspondence regarding contributions not accepted.

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Book Reviews

The East Indies

India's Fateful Hour by Sir William Barton (John Murray, 5s).

Malayan Postscript by Ian Morrison (Faber & Faber, 8s6d).

Commonsense About India by Lord Huntingdon (Heinemann, 3s 6d).

India's Fateful Hour, by a retired official of the Government of India, leaves out most of the relevant facts and obscures all the real issues. It is full of half-truths, misstatements and inconsistencies too numerous to be examined in detail. India is not a nation struggling for freedom. . . . Congress is an unrepresentative body . . . religion is the main element in the creed of the Indian parties . . . trade union leaders are "often unscrupulous agitators" . . . the peasants were foolish to have voted for Congress . . . and so on. It is the same old tedious bureaucratic patter with which people everywhere are getting more and more impatient.

Malayan Postscript is a lucid and objective account of events in Malaya from the date of Japan's entry into the war to the fall of Singapore. It reminds us that Malaya, too, had its Sir William Bartons—officials about whose thinking "there was a curious atmosphere of unreality." Mr. Morrison, the author, is *The Times* correspondent whose despatches from Singapore aroused much interest at the time. Writing with studied restraint, he tells of "considerable defeatism among the troops," many of whom "failed to see that Malaya . . . was a stake worth dying for," observes that "it was surprising that the morale of the Asiatics was not very much worse than it was," and notes the total absence of any effort to secure their co-operation until it was too late. Even three days after the siege of Singapore had begun, when General Percival wanted to meet the Press, the officer in charge "forgot completely to inform the editors of all the vernacular Malay, Chinese and Indian papers."

Mr. Morrison is very sparing in his judgments, but one of them is worth quoting here. "There does not appear to be any such thing," he says, "as a 'military nation' or an 'unmilitary nation.'" The only thing that matters is that people should feel that the things which they are fighting and dying for are worth fighting and dying for, and that they should have a minimum of essential equipment." This is the commonsense view. It knocks the bottom out of the various categories—martial, non-martial, political, unpolitical, etc.—into which "experts" like Sir William Barton are so fond of dividing the people of India.

It is also the view upon which Lord Huntingdon lays special emphasis in his *Commonsense About India*. "To rally a people of 400 millions to arms, it is necessary to give that people something to fight for." He points out that the situation to-day is both alarming and fantastic, and urges, on

grounds of idealism as well as of practical expediency, that the Government should immediately reach a settlement with the Indian people instead of trying to cow them into temporary submission. We have the choice, as he says, of either winning the friendship they are so willing to give, or fighting on their soil while they remain "apathetically neutral or even hostile to us"—as in Malaya.

Unlike Sir William, who is elaborately evasive and makes it all seem remote and incomprehensible, Lord Huntingdon is clear, persuasive and methodical in his presentation. His object is to dispel misconceptions, not to spread confusion. The situation in India goes from bad to worse, and if it is not to end in calamity, democratically-minded people in Britain must understand the facts—and act. Not the least of the merits of this excellent little book is that it also explains what we can all do *now* to hasten the solution.

K. S. SHELANKAR.

The Red Navy

The Red Fleet and the Royal Navy by Mairin Mitchell (Hodder & Stoughton, 2s6d).

The Soviet Navy by D. F. Springhall (Russia Today Society, 6d).

"THE WORK of raising a navy which has been powerful enough to keep for so long the Black Sea and its chief oil ports out of German hands, to bar the seaward passage of German troops to the Caucasus and to prevent Leningrad from being taken from the seaward side, has not been the work of frantic, last hour efforts." With these words Mairin Mitchell indicates the theme of his first rate account, not only of the Red Fleet, but of the strategic role it plays in the present conflict, the importance and place of Arctic navigation to the Soviet Union and the growing importance of Russia's inland waterways. The author writes from the standpoint of the Navy League, but has mastered the available material and writes with real sympathy and understanding. Here we can find all the available data respecting the Soviet naval forces and the important actions they have fought since 1939. Springhall's pamphlet is an indispensable supplement, adding much valuable data on the conditions of service, the history of the new Navy, education and culture and recent achievements, both on and under the water. Both books are well illustrated.

The Prime Minister recently stated that the Russians were "land animals" and could not easily comprehend our situation as a maritime power. It is time this delusion was dispelled. Russian successes on land, which have saved us as well as our ally from disaster, have depended to a considerable degree on persistent and courageous naval defence and offence in the Barents Sea, the Baltic and especially in the Black Sea, where, according to *The Times* Istanbul Correspondent, Russia continues to hold "undisputed mastery."

JOHN LEWIS.

LABOUR MONTHLY DEVELOPMENT FUND

Total Received in January, 1943 : £36 : 1 : 9

Dear Friends and Comrades,

We are really bothered this month. At the time of going to press the total received by the Development Fund this month is only £36. We cannot recall when we had so low a sum—certainly not throughout the whole of 1942 or 1941, and expenses have by no means dropped since then. We hope those of you who are Discussion Group members will note, with shame, that only three groups have sent in donations this month. Our newly appointed Field Organiser for Discussion Groups has now left on his first round of visits, and among other vital items on his agenda this question of financial support for the Fund will be found quite high up.

Again, it is the soldiers who are right at the top, to the fore and in the vanguard, to use a multiplicity of metaphors. We notice on reading donation lists to other deserving causes that the same holds good. Just think of it, you factory workers earning real money, here's "Red Airman" sending us a pound of his back pay; "Red Corporal" sending £3 13s.; and Samuel Mill 10s. What a hole that must make in their inadequate pay! Enclosing £1, still another soldier says: "With your help we can make it VICTORY YEAR." But the help must be mutual, and we must ask all readers to do their part, and to support the LABOUR MONTHLY *in addition* to meeting all the other most necessary calls on their cash.

Now that copies of LABOUR MONTHLY are so scarce and so precious, may we urge you to share your copy with those who were not lucky enough to get one. BUT—get them to pay for the privilege! One reader tells us that he sells his copy *four times*—result: two shillings for the Development Fund.

Here is a chance for readers to help the soldiers as well as the Fund. An airman writes: "Any copies which civilian readers could send on to friends in the Forces will be greatly appreciated." We shall be very happy at this office to act as a clearing-office for any copies which readers can bear to part with, and in addition to have the names of any other soldiers who would like to receive secondhand copies of the paper, so far as we have a response to this request. Any such copies should be clearly marked "Please Forward."

Yours fraternally,

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